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IMPROVIDENT STUDENT LENDING
Joseph Sanders* and Vijay Raghavan**
Abstract
The idea that lending without regard to ability to repay should be
illegal is not particularly new, but it gained purchase in recent years with
the rapid growth of high-cost mortgage loans. In the late 1990s, law
enforcement and private litigants began attacking predatory mortgage
lenders on the grounds they were making loans that borrowers could not
afford. Both before and after the financial crisis of 2008, state and federal
legislators imposed reforms on the mortgage market that provided relief
to borrowers whose lenders failed to determine whether they had
sufficient income to afford their monthly mortgage payments.
This Article seeks to address two gaps in the literature on ability to
repay. The first is the lack of research on the application of the ability-torepay standard to nonmortgage credit products. Second, the Article
identifies a trend toward an increased focus on ex post loan performance
as opposed to ex ante risk assessments to determine whether a lender
considered a borrower’s ability to repay. The example of litigation
against for-profit colleges’ student loan activities illustrates these points.
INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the twenty-first century, there was a scholarly consensus that the
regulatory framework to protect consumers in the consumer financial marketplace
was outdated. Proponents of reform were roughly divided in two camps: a rules
camp and a standards camp.1 The rules camp pushed for the creation of a new federal
*

© 2018 Joseph Sanders.
© 2018 Vijay Raghavan. Assistant Attorneys General, Illinois Attorney General’s
Office. The views expressed in this article are our own and do not reflect the official opinion
of the Illinois Attorney General’s Office. The authors wish to thank Thomas Lingard, Taylor
Webb, Alexis Juergens, and the Utah Law Review for their edits and including us in the
Financing the Future symposium. The authors also wish to thank Kathleen Engel and Susan
Ellis for their insightful comments and edits on this paper. All errors are our own.
1
Others have noted a similar division between reform proponents, though not
necessarily identifying the division along the familiar rules versus standards line. See, e.g.,
Jean Braucher, Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection, 7 BROOK. J. OF
CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 107, 109–10 (2012) (detailing two policy arguments in favor of
reform as formal rule-making and as anti-abuse standards to ensure financial products were
free of “tricks and traps”); John Pottow, Ability to Pay, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 175, 193
(2011) (noting that “just as Elizabeth Warren agitated for a consumer financial protection
agency for some time, so too have academics kept the pressure on for some form of suitability
or similar duty on mortgage lenders”).
**
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regulator empowered to promulgate technocratic rules to ensure the safety of
consumer financial products.2 The standards camp pushed for standards that would
impose duties on lenders to ensure financial products were suitable for prospective
consumers.3
In 2010, Congress passed Dodd-Frank,4 incorporating proposals from each
camp. Dodd-Frank created a new federal agency empowered to promulgate rules to
regulate consumer financial products.5 Dodd-Frank also created a new standard6 of
abusiveness for consumer financial products, which, as some have argued, prohibits
lenders from making loans without regard to ability to repay.7 There is extensive
literature examining the new regulatory framework Dodd-Frank created, but little
scholarship on how the ability-to-repay standard in Dodd-Frank and a parallel
standard under state unfair and deceptive practices laws (“UDAP”) have been
applied to curb abuses in nonmortgage financial products.8 This Article seeks to fill
that gap by examining the evolution of the ability to repay as a legal standard and
describing its application by law enforcement against improvident lending by forprofit colleges.
Part I of this Article traces the evolution of ability to repay as a legal standard
from the early efforts to outlaw improvident lending to recent scholarship
advocating for a suitability standard in consumer lending. Part I considers why early
efforts to outlaw improvident lending failed and how the growth in predatory lending
in the latter-half of the twentieth century led scholars to reevaluate the effectiveness
of existing consumer protection laws. Part I also examines how law enforcement and
2
This view is best encapsulated in Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit
Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008), and in Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5
DEMOCRACY: J. IDEAS 3 (2007), https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-anyrate/ [https://perma.cc/F3AN-ED5B], an earlier article from Warren arguing for the creation
of a financial product safety commission.
3
An early version of this argument can be found in Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A.
McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 1255, 1318–20 (2002). Engel & McCoy’s proposal was for a suitability standard
refined through rule-making. For a more extensive discussion of the history of suitability as
a standard in American law, see Pottow, supra note 1, at 185–95.
4
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank] (codified in scattered parts of the United
States Code).
5
Id. at 1955–2113.
6
See 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)(2) (effective July 21, 2010).
7
See Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frank and Consumer Financial
Protection Act’s “Abusive” Standard, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 118, 122–24 (2011)
(arguing that abusiveness in the CFPA should make it illegal for a lender to extend credit
without regard to the borrower’s ability to pay).
8
For a discussion of the history and defining features of UDAP laws, see Prentiss Cox
et al., Strategies of Public UDAP Enforcement, HARV. J. LEGIS. (forthcoming 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2942406 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2942406
[https://perma.cc/48QW-VMMU].
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private litigants fit ability to repay into traditional unfairness and unconscionability
doctrines to combat predatory subprime mortgage lending.
Part II of this Article examines how law enforcement has applied ability to
repay as a legal standard to combat fraud in nonmortgage financial products. Part II
specifically considers the use of ability to repay in litigation against for-profit
colleges for abusive lending practices. As Part II suggests, an important feature of
recent applications of the ability-to-repay standard is the focus on ex post loan
performance as opposed to ex ante risk assessment to determine whether a lender
failed to consider a borrower’s ability to repay a loan. This shift mirrors a similar
shift in the legal literature with some scholars arguing that consumer regulation
should move away from prescriptive rules and, instead, impose liability based on
how well loans perform.9
This Article concludes by highlighting the critical role that states can play as
the current President and Congress rollback many of the consumer financial reforms
of the past decade.
I. IMPROVIDENT LENDING: A BRIEF HISTORY
This Section provides a brief history of efforts to curb improvident lending.
This Section specifically focuses on litigation over predatory mortgage lending and
legislative proposals to restrain these practices. We argue that an important aspect
of early efforts to restrain improvident lending in mortgage markets is the focus on
the features of a loan at the time of origination that indicate failure to consider ability
to repay. This focus on ex ante risk assessment distinguishes these early efforts from
more recent efforts, which look, in part, to ex post performance measures such as
default rates to demonstrate a lender’s failure to adequately assess ability to repay.
A. Early Efforts to Outlaw Improvident Lending10
The idea that improvident lending—lending without regard to a borrower’s
ability to repay—should be illegal is not particularly new. Complaints about
unscrupulous creditors overloading unsuspecting debtors appeared as early as the
Great Depression.11 The concern over improvident lending emerged again in the

9

See Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309,
1311–15 (2015) (arguing in favor of performance-based standards in consumer regulation).
10
This part provides a short overview of this history of efforts to outlaw improvident
lending. For a more detailed discussion, see Teri R. Daniel, Note, Improvident Extension of
Credit as an Extension of Unconscionability: Discover Bank v. Owens and a Debtor’s Rights
Against Credit Card Companies, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 435, 440–46 (2006); see also
Braucher, supra note 1, at 118–20 (outlining Vern Countryman’s efforts to outlaw
improvident lending).
11
Wesley A. Sturges & Don E. Cooper, Credit Administration and Wage Earner
Bankruptcies, 42 YALE L. J. 487, 524 (1933) (noting that “[c]redit is often extended carelessly
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1960s and 1970s, championed most prominently by Vern Countryman. Countryman,
citing the rise of consumer bankruptcies in the 1960s, lamented the fact that
unscrupulous creditors failed to engage in thorough credit investigation of potential
borrowers “[b]ecause loss ratios are low, thanks in part to the ability of the
institutional credit extenders to reach the debtor’s future wages even though he
obtains a bankruptcy discharge.”12
Countryman pushed for legislative changes to define and expressly prohibit
improvident extensions of credit or include the concept of improvident credit
extension in the definition of unconscionability.13 As an example, in 1972, the
National Commission on Consumer Finance proposed the following amendment,
drafted by Countryman, to Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code:
In determining whether a consumer credit transaction is unconscionable,
the bankruptcy court, in addition to case law, should consider whether the
transaction entailed an “improvident extension of credit.” The court
should, in fact, consider whether the creditor made “an extension of credit
to a debtor where it cannot be reasonably expected that the debtor can
repay the debt in full in view of the circumstances of the debtor as known
to the creditor and of such circumstances as would have been revealed to
him upon reasonable inquiry prior to the credit extension.”14
The National Consumer Law Center, the Brookings Institute, the American Bar
Association, and the National Bankruptcy Conference made similar proposals during
this time period.15 Not all scholars, however, agreed that the law should be modified.
Ronald Hersbergen, for example, believed that unconscionability encompassed
claims based on improvident extensions of credit.16 Specifically, Hersbergen argued
that procedural unconscionability—unconscionability in the contract formation
process—covered the nonuse or misuse of credit information and creditors taking
advantage of unsophisticated consumers.17 Hersbergen further argued that
substantive unconscionability—unconscionable contract terms—could be used to

and without adequate inquiry, or with the expectation that profits from the increased volume
of sales will exceed probable credit losses”).
12
Vern Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension: A New Legal Concept Aborning?,
27 ME. L. REV. 1, 6 (1975) (emphasis omitted).
13
See id. at 8–15.
14
Id. at 13–14 (quoting NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER
CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 42 (1972)).
15
See id. at 8–15.
16
See Ronald L. Hersbergen, The Improvident Extension of Credit as an
Unconscionable Contract, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 225, 292 (1974).
17
See id.
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attack contract terms that reflect extreme exploitation by a creditor of a borrower’s
lack of sophistication.18
While no major federal legislation emerged during this period, several states
expanded state law unconscionability to cover improvident extensions of credit. As
an example, the D.C. Administrative Code provides that it is an unlawful trade
practice to “make or enforce unconscionable terms or provisions of sales or leases”
and that “in applying this [standard], consideration shall be given to,” among other
factors, “knowledge by the person at the time credit sales are consummated that there
was no reasonable probability of payment in full of the obligation by the
consumer.”19
B. The Emergence of Predatory and Subprime Lending
Although concern over improvident credit extensions had some purchase in the
early twentieth century, it did not feature prominently in efforts to curb fraud
perpetrated against consumers. One explanation for the paucity of improvident
lending claims is that the kind of predatory lending that concerned Countryman was
practiced primarily by businesses operating at the margins of the credit industry. As
these businesses were likely also engaging in various forms of deception, federal
and state laws prohibiting deceptive conduct provided consumers with adequate
protections.
In 1981, economists Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss proposed a formal
model of lending using information economics, which helps explain why predatory
lending operated at the margins and not the center of consumer financial markets.20
In Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, Stiglitz and Weiss
suggested that lenders operating in markets in which they possess imperfect
information about potential borrowers would engage in credit rationing and limit the
18

See id. at 292–93. As an example, Professor Hersbergen points to a New York state
court decision in which a court found unconscionable a sale to welfare recipients of a freezer
unit, having an actual value of $300, for a total price, including sales tax and credit charges,
of $1440. Id. Credit charges alone exceeded by $100 the retail value of the freezer, which
fact itself was felt by the court to be sufficient to sustain the decision. Id; see also Anne
Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the Poor,” 102 GEO. L. J.
1383 (2014) (discussing the famous DC Circuit unconscionability decision Williams v.
Walker-Thomas furniture, which held that credit sales of merchandise may be
unconscionable if the terms of the sale made it impossible for the borrower to obtain the
merchandise).
19
D.C. CODE § 28-3904(r)(1) (2017). In addition to the District of Columbia, the Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, and Ohio legislatures each similarly expanded the definition of
unconscionability under state law to include knowledge that the borrower had no reasonable
probability of repaying their obligation. See IDAHO CODE § 28-46-111(3) (1983); IOWA
CODE § 537.5108 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-6-111 (1973); ME. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 6-111
(1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (1977).
20
See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 394 (1981).
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amount of credit available.21 Stiglitz and Weiss suggested that rationing occurs for
two reasons. First, where lenders cannot effectively distinguish among borrowers,
lenders will set interest rates below the market-clearing rate as a screening device in
order to avoid adverse selection:
The adverse selection aspect of interest rates is a consequence of different
borrowers having different probabilities of repaying their loan. The
expected return to the bank obviously depends on the probability of
repayment, so the bank would like to be able to identify borrowers who
are more likely to repay. It is difficult to identify “good borrowers,” and
to do so requires the bank to use a variety of screening devices. The interest
rate which an individual is willing to pay may act as one such screening
device: those who are willing to pay high interest rates may, on average,
be worse risks; they are willing to borrow at high interest rates because
they perceive their probability of repaying the loan to be low. As the
interest rate rises, the average “riskiness” of those who borrow increases,
possibly lowering the bank’s profits.22
Second, where banks can distinguish between borrowers ex ante through credit
scoring or some other means, lenders will likely engage in redlining by limiting
credit to borrowers whose expected return (given the borrower’s expected
probability of default) is above the lender’s cost of funds.23 The consequence of the
Stiglitz-Weiss model is that lenders with limited information and high capital costs
will generally only lend to the most credit-worthy borrowers.
The Stiglitz-Weiss model accurately described the home mortgage market (and
likely the broader consumer lending market) until the late 1980s.24 As Kathleen
Engel and Patricia McCoy explained in an article on the early rise of subprime
mortgage lending, the lending market changed in the late 1980s in two ways that
brought predatory lending into the mainstream. First, “longitudinal data and
sophisticated credit-scoring and underwriting models” made it possible for lenders
“to engage in more accurate risk assessment of people who, in the past, were
observationally indistinct.”25 Second, securitization “reduced the marginal cost of
procuring additional capital to lend and consequently lenders are less constrained in
terms of the amount of money that they can lend.”26 In addition, securitization also
enabled lenders to shift risk onto investors.27 Securitization and improved creditscoring models freed mainstream lenders from engaging in credit rationing and
redlining to minimize losses.
21

See id.
Id. at 393.
23
See id. at 406–07.
24
See Engel & McCoy, supra note 3, at 1272.
25
Id. at 1278.
26
Id. at 1279.
27
See id.
22
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As credit expanded, concerns surfaced about unscrupulous lenders extending
credit to borrowers who could not afford to repay their debts. Engel and McCoy
described a segmented mortgage market with a prime market, a legitimate subprime
market, and a predatory market.28 The legitimate subprime market served borrowers
who presented elevated risk levels and were previously shut out of credit markets
due to Stiglitz-Weiss-type rationing.29 Lenders in the legitimate subprime market
sought to lend to these borrowers at higher rates than borrowers were charged in the
prime market.30 By contrast, the predatory lending market exploited the expansion
of credit to target a wider range of borrowers, most of whom were disconnected from
credit markets.31 This included borrowers with blemished credit and borrowers who
actually would have qualified for prime loans, but were lured into loans with
predatory terms.32
C. Litigation Over Improvident Lending
The growth in predatory mortgage lending prior to the financial crisis of 2008
spurred private litigants and state law enforcement to pursue claims alleging that
improvident extensions of credit violated state consumer protection laws. These
cases broadly fell into three categories: (1) claims that lending without regard to
ability to repay was unconscionable; (2) state UDAP claims arguing that it was
unfair and deceptive for a lender to make a loan without sufficient underwriting; and
(3) UDAP claims that loans engineered to fail were structurally unfair.33
Unconscionability claims were brought under both state common law and
specific state statutes. These claims typically involved unsophisticated consumers
who were exploited by lenders falsifying loan information or making otherwise
unrealistic assumptions about the consumers’ ability to repay costly loans. For
example, in City Financial Services v. Smith,34 the plaintiff loaned the defendant
$3,000 at 22% interest plus $618 in insurance and other charges.35 At the time of the
loan, the defendant had $574 in monthly disability income, was already in default
on a separate loan from the plaintiff, and had over $6,700 in other credit card debt.36
The defendant defaulted on her first payment and the plaintiff brought a breach of
contract claim.37 The defendant countered that the entire loan transaction should be
28

See id.
See id.
30
See id.
31
See id.
32
See id.
33
For an extensive discussion of UDAP claims against improvident extensions of
credit, see CAROLYN L. CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., UNFAIR
AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 6.3 (9th ed. 2016).
34
No. 97 CVF 00679, 2000 WL 288469 (Ohio Mun. Ct. Jan. 4, 2000).
35
See id. at *1.
36
See id. at *2.
37
See id. at *1.
29
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voided based on a theory of improvident lending.38 The Court agreed.39 Specifically,
the Court noted that the plaintiff inflated the defendant’s income to make it appear
that she could afford to repay the loan when, in fact, her income was not sufficient
to meet the monthly payments.40 The Court held that:
The enhancement of [defendant’s] income . . . creates an element of
unconscionability in the contract when it was made. In light of the specific
terms of repayment, leaving [defendant] with only $120 in disposable
income per month while knowing of outstanding credit card debt of over
$6,700, and her timely failure to pay on an original loan with [plaintiff],
this contract is unenforceable.41
Other courts reached the same conclusion when confronted with unconscionability
claims under similar facts.42
Although some private litigants who fought improvident extensions of credit
on unconscionability grounds such as the defendant in City Financial Services fared
well, litigants who brought similar claims under state UDAP laws had more mixed
results. While some courts have held that knowingly approving loans based on
falsified information is unfair,43 many other courts have concluded that where
lenders failed to adequately underwrite a loan, did not determine the borrower’s
ability to repay, or placed the borrower in a loan with terms much worse than those
for which the borrower qualified did not violate state UDAP laws because the
lenders were not fiduciaries and did not owe the borrowers a duty of care.44
38

See id. at *2.
See id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
See, e.g., Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Inv’rs Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 744 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (holding that a reasonable jury could conclude defendant lent to plaintiff knowing
there was no reasonable probability of payment in full of the obligation where plaintiff’s
income was misstated and defendant was aware that plaintiff was disabled, elderly, and
unlikely to be able to supplement his meager income over the life of the loan); Carrol v.
Fremont Inv. & Loan, 636 F. Supp. 2d 41, 52 (D.D.C. 2009); Matthews v. New Century
Mortg. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 874, 892 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
43
See Martinez v. Freedom Mortg. Team, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 827, 837 (N.D. Ill.
2007) (holding that “knowingly approving home loans based on false information offends
public policy, is unscrupulous and can cause substantial injury to consumers” is unfair, “if
not downright deceptive” where plaintiff’s loan application was approved, even though
lender knew appraisal was false, to induce plaintiff to take out a larger loan).
44
See, e.g., Teaupa v. U.S. Nat’l Bank N.A., 836 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1099 (D. Haw.
2011) (relying on this theory to dismiss a UDAP claim for failure to state a claim); Marzan
v. Bank of America, 779 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152 (D. Haw. 2011), abrogated by Compton v.
Countrywide Fin. Corp., 761 F.3d 1046, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2014) (disagreeing with this line
of cases and holding that “borrowers are not obliged to show that the lender owed the
borrower a common law duty of care to state a claim” under Hawaii’s UDAP statute; they
39
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Perhaps the most interesting of the improvident lending cases of the past decade
was the Massachusetts Attorney General’s case against notorious subprime mortgage
lender, Fremont.45 In Fremont, the Massachusetts Attorney General alleged that
loans originated by Fremont with the following features were engineered to fail and,
thus, structurally unfair under Massachusetts’ UDAP law: (1) adjustable-rate
mortgages with teaser rates of three years or less; (2) teaser rates 3% below the fully
indexed rate; (3) debt-to-income ratios calculated using the teaser rate; and (4) loanto-value ratios close to 100% or loans that featured large prepayment penalties that
extended beyond the introductory rate period.46 The Massachusetts Supreme Court
agreed with the Massachusetts Attorney General which held that:
Fremont as a lender should have recognized that loans with the first three
characteristics just described were “doomed to foreclosure” unless the
borrower could refinance the loan at or near the end of the introductory
rate period, and obtain in the process a new and low introductory rate. The
fourth factor, however, would make it essentially impossible for subprime
borrowers to refinance unless housing prices increased . . . . To issue a
home mortgage loan whose success relies on the hope that the fair market
value of the home will increase during the introductory period is as unfair
as issuing a home mortgage loan whose success depends on the hope that
the borrower’s income will increase during that same period.47
The Court in Fremont further noted that Fremont made no effort to consider the
borrower’s ability to “make the scheduled payments under the terms of the loan.”48
Furthermore, Fremont was insulated from losses arising from borrower default
because it sold the loans on the secondary market.49
A common thread among the various claims outlined in this section is that
lenders knew or should have known consumers had no ability to repay their loan
based on factors that existed at the time the loans were originated. The focus on
lenders’ failure to determine borrowers’ ability to repay ex ante is a defining feature
of subprime mortgage litigation and, as explained in Part II, a characteristic that
distinguishes these cases from the more recent attacks against improvident lending
in nonmortgage credit products, which focus on loan performance ex post.

“need only address whether the complaint adequately alleges that the lender used unfair or
deceptive acts in its relationship with the borrower”).
45
See Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 2008).
46
Id. at 554.
47
Id. (citation omitted).
48
Id. at 558.
49
Id. at 552.

928

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

D. Suitability, Exploding Loans, and the Creation
of a Federal Unconscionability Standard
Although private litigants and law enforcement found some success combating
improvident lending in mortgage markets as unconscionable or unfair, some
scholars contended that the existing legal tools were inadequate to address the
problem. Engel and McCoy, for example, argued that existing contract and antifraud
laws were insufficient to address the growing problem of predatory lending.50
Specifically, they argued that courts narrowly applied unconscionability.51 Engel
and McCoy also argued that while state UDAP laws held some promise, state
attorneys general selectively enforcing state UDAP laws against predatory lenders
made it an inadequate remedy.52 Engel and McCoy proposed a federal suitability
standard, similar to the standards imposed on securities brokers and insurance
agents, which would impose a duty on lenders to determine the suitability of a loan
for a particular borrower. 53 Engel and McCoy believed a broad standard of suitability
that would be refined through rulemaking54 with dual federal and state jurisdiction
would be a more effective tool against the problem of predatory lending.55
Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren similarly argued against the adequacy of
existing laws to combat improvident lending in their now famous article Making
Credit Safer.56 Bar-Gill and Warren lamented the lack of parity between consumer
safety laws governing traditional consumer products and those governing consumer
financial products.57 Bar-Gill and Warren noted that consumers of physical products
could enter the market confident that they would not be “deceived into buying
exploding toasters.”58 In contrast, consumers could not enter the market for
consumer financial products confident they would not be sold exploding loans.59
Bar-Gill and Warren took the position that the problem with existing law was that it
did not prohibit specific practices.60 Instead, the law evolved through common law
interpretations of unconscionability, which courts were “very circumspect” in
applying.61 Moreover, Bar-Gill and Warren argued that federal preemption of state
law enforcement62 and the limited authority of the Federal Trade Commission63
50

See Engel & McCoy, supra note 3, at 1299–1305.
See id. at 1300–01.
52
See id. at 1303–05.
53
See id. at 1342–43.
54
See id. at 1343.
55
See id. at 1340.
56
See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 70–95.
57
See id. at 6.
58
See id. at 7.
59
See id.
60
See id. at 75–76.
61
Id. at 71.
62
See id. at 79–83.
63
See id. at 95–97.
51
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prevented federal and state law enforcement from attacking the worst of abuses in
the lending industry. Bar-Gill and Warren’s proposed solution was the creation of a
new federal agency that would be empowered to promulgate ex ante regulation to
ensure the safety of consumer financial products.64
In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank, which incorporated elements of the
Bar-Gill and Warren and the Engel and McCoy proposals.65 As Bar-Gill and Warren
advocated, Title X of Dodd-Frank (known as the “Consumer Financial Protection
Act of 2010” or “CFPA”) created a new federal agency, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), empowered to create rules to regulate consumer
financial products.66 Dodd-Frank not only addressed regulation of mortgage
markets, but also gave the CFPB and state attorneys general the authority to bring
claims against creditors for engaging in unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices
(“UDAAP”). 67 The UDAAP prohibitions apply to consumer credit products, not just
mortgages. The concepts of unfairness and deception have been part of the federal
and state UDAP laws for decades;68 however, the abusive standard is unique to the
Dodd-Frank Act.
Dodd-Frank defined an abusive act or practice as one that:
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a
term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of—
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or
service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to
act in the interests of the consumer.69
Although the definition of abusive does not expressly refer to ability to repay,
it has been argued that the language of the provision encompasses these concepts.70
Section (2)(B) mirrors the definition of unconscionability under the Uniform
Commercial Code and in many state laws to create a federal unconscionability

64

See id. at 98.
See Dodd-Frank, supra note 4.
66
See id. at 1955–2113 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
67
See 12 U.S.C. § 5552 (effective July 21, 2010) (providing state enforcement of the
provisions of CFPA).
68
See Cox et al., supra note 8.
69
Dodd-Frank, supra note 4, at 2006, sec. 1031 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (effective
July 21, 2010)).
70
See Lee, supra note 7, at 122–23.
65
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standard.71 Section (2)(A) encompasses the idea that a lender has a duty to avoid
taking advantage of consumers, who do not understand that they cannot afford the
proffered loan.72 And arguably, Section (2)(C) prohibits lenders from taking
advantage of borrowers who reasonably rely on their lenders to make loans that they
can afford.73 Such a loan would also take advantage of the consumer’s expectation
that a lender will not make a loan the lender is almost certain will fail.
II. IMPROVIDENT LENDING IN THE PRIVATE STUDENT LOAN MARKET
This section examines the recent application of the ability-to-repay standard to
curb improvident, private student loans.74 In claims against private schools, the
CFPB and state attorneys general have alleged that the schools, by offering or
guaranteeing loans that their students could not afford, violated the prohibition on
unfair or abusive acts or practices.75 These cases are significant, in large part because
the government attorneys successfully developed a new approach to assessing
borrowers’ ability to repay. Rather than an ex ante approach that looks at borrowers’
financial situations at consummation to determine whether they could afford a loan,

71
Dodd-Frank, supra note 4, at 2006, sec. 1031 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (effective
July 21, 2010)).
72
Id. Lee, supra note 7, at 122–23 (arguing that Section (2)(A) makes it an abusive
practice to fail to adequately assess a consumer’s ability to repay based on the extensive
empirical literature demonstrating that consumers often fail to understand “common
financial products because of their complexity and prolix agreements”).
73
Dodd-Frank, supra note 4, at 2006, sec. 1031 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (effective
July 21, 2010)).
74
Although this Section focuses on the example of private student loans, it is important
to note that the ability-to-repay standard has been applied in other contexts after the financial
crisis. See, e.g., Complaint at ¶ 57, CFPB v. Am. Debt Settlement Sols., Inc., No. 9:13-cv80548-DMM, 2013 WL 12094225 (S.D. Fla. June 7, 2013) [hereinafter Am. Debt.
Complaint] (alleging that defendants engaged in abusive practice by enrolling consumers in
debt-relief programs they were highly unlikely to complete); Payday, Vehicle Title, and
Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg. 54,472, 54,521 (Nov. 17, 2017) (codified
at 12 C.F.R. § 1041) [hereinafter CFPB’s Payday Rule] (noting that “although the legislative
history on the meaning of Dodd-Frank Act’s abusiveness standard is fairly limited, it
suggests that Congress was particularly concerned about the widespread practice of lenders
making unaffordable loans to consumers”).
75
Second Amended Complaint at 73–80, Illinois v. Alta Colls., Inc., No. 14-cv-3786,
2014 WL 4377579 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Second Amended Complaint];
Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at 1, CFPB v. ITT Educ. Serv., Inc., 219 F.
Supp. 3d 878 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-00292) [hereinafter ITT Complaint].
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law enforcement centered their legal arguments on ex post evidence, arguing that
high default rates indicate that the loans were unaffordable from the start.76 The shift
from an ex ante analysis of borrowers’ financial situation to an ex post review of
loan performance gives courts a simple, objective indicator that loans were not
affordable.
A. The Private Student Loan Market and Institutional Loans
A common feature of predatory lending practices is that profit and performance
are decoupled. Put differently, a lender only disregards a borrower’s ability to repay
when the lender’s profit is disconnected from the borrower’s ability to repay.77 Riskshifting in subprime mortgage lending, collateral churning by “buy here/pay here”
car dealers, and wage assignments in small-dollar, high-cost lending separate profit
from performance. As explained below, in the market for institutional loans by forprofit colleges, federal law makes it possible to separate profit from performance.
Much of the higher education sector is financed through student loans. There
are currently $1.45 trillion in outstanding student loans.78 Of that $1.45 trillion, the
vast majority, $1.3 trillion, consists of federal student loans.79 For most schools,
access to federal student loans is essential to their ability to continue operating. Title
IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (“HEA”) provides the statutory framework
for federal student loans.80 Under Title IV, the Department of Education administers
the bulk of federal student loan programs, including the Federal Family Education
Loan (“FFEL”) Program and the William D. Ford Direct Student Loan Program
(“Direct Loan” program).81
Proprietary, or for-profit schools,82 experienced rapid growth in the last two
decades.83 For example, in the 2008–2009 academic year, for-profit schools
accounted for 10 percent of all post-secondary degrees (i.e., associate, bachelor’s,
76

Second Amended Complaint, supra note 75, at ¶¶ 12, 127, 152–155, 162, 172, 181;
see also id. at ¶¶ 112-117, 136, 462–67, 480, 483, 491-492.
77
See Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime
Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 12 (2009) (quoting guidance from prudential banking
regulators defining predatory lending practices as practices where a lender underwrites a loan
based on the value of the borrower’s collateral or some measure other than the borrower’s
ability to repay).
78
Consumer Credit Outstanding (Levels) (Q2, 2017), BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RES. SYS. (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/HIST/cc_hist_
memo_levels.html [https://perma.cc/TWL7-S2X3].
79
Student Loan Portfolio (Q2, 2017), FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/
about/data-center/student/portfolio [https://perma.cc/AC9X-EHPX].
80
20 U.S.C. §§ 1070–1099 (2018).
81
Id.
82
See 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b) (2018).
83
Undergraduate Enrollment, Figure 4, NAT’L. CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. (MAY 2017),
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cha.asp [https://perma.cc/Z2RH-MUJB].
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and master’s), up from 4 percent in 1998–1999.84 In the 2010–2011 academic year,
for-profit schools enrolled approximately 2.4 million students or close to 12 percent
of all postsecondary students.85
For-profit schools offer expensive educational programs of dubious merit and
target their services to vulnerable populations.86 As a result, for-profit schools are
subject to several regulatory constraints on their operation, including a limit on the
percentage of income they are allowed to receive under Title IV of the HEA, a
requirement commonly referred to as the 90/10 Rule. The 90/10 Rule requires that
for-profit schools obtain 10% of their income from non-Title IV sources.87 The 90/10
Rule was designed to ensure for-profit schools were not set up to solely take
advantage of federal funds for private education and modeled in part on amendments
to the original G.I. Bill.88
In practice, the 90/10 Rule has the unintended consequence of creating
financial products that are loss leaders, designed to allow schools access to Title IV
money.89 These products are often referred to as “institutional loans” because they
are made or guaranteed by the post-secondary institution the borrower attends.90 For
a time, students regularly obtained loans from banks to cover the 10 percent of their
costs not covered by private loans. However, in the late 2000s, banks retreated from

84

See Anthony J. Guida & David Figuli, Higher Education’s Gainful Employment and
90/10 Rules: Unintended “Scarlet Letters” for Minority, Low-Income, and Other At-Risk
Students, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 137 (2012).
85
See Sarah Ann Schade, Reining in the Predatory Nature of For-Profit Colleges, 56
ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 320 (2014). Changes to federal regulations over the past five years have
reduced enrollment at for-profit schools. See Undergraduate Enrollment, supra note 83. The
current Department of Education, however, has initiated formal rulemaking to rollback these
regulations, which present the possibility of a rebound in enrollment at for-profit schools.
See, e.g., Negotiated Rulemaking Committee; Public Hearings, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,640, 27,640–
41 (June 16, 2017).
86
See Schade, supra note 85, at 322–27. But see Guida & Figuli, supra note 84, at 141
(acknowledging that for-profits target their services at low-income consumers at high risk of
not completing their educational program but contending that demographic factors as
opposed school quality and cost are responsible consumers’ high risk).
87
See 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(24) (2018).
88
For more detailed background on the 90/10 rule, see generally Jaclyn Patton,
Encouraging Exploitation of the Military by For-Profit Colleges: The New GI Bill and the
90/10 Rule, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 425 (2012) (providing history of 90/10 rule and arguing
against allowing GI Bill funds to satisfy proprietary schools’ 10 percent requirement).
89
See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR AND PENSIONS, 112TH CONG.,
REP. ON FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL
INVESTMENT AND ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS 144–46 (Comm. Print 2012),
https://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/for_profit_report/PartI-PartIII-SelectedAppendixes
.pdf [https://perma.cc/U325-G7VY] [hereinafter FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION].
90
See id. at 117, 135.
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making private student loans because of the financial crisis.91 For-profit schools
were left without an income source to fill the 10% requirement, and thus risked
losing access to Title IV funds, an outcome that would have put many out of
business.92 In response, schools began to issue their own loans, 50 percent of which
could be immediately booked as non-Title IV income.93 Schools also began to
engineer private loan programs issued through third parties, which the schools
guaranteed in the event of default.94 This enabled schools to book 100 percent of the
income as non-Title IV upon origination of the loan.95 Regardless whether the school
operated as an originator or a guarantor, the for-profit schools made the loans for the
purpose of being eligible for Title IV funding; they had no expectation of loans being
repaid.
B. For-Profit College Litigation
Following the financial crisis of 2008, state attorney generals’ offices and the
newly created CFPB began to see institutional loans crop up in consumer complaints
against for-profit schools.96 In 2014, the Illinois Attorney General (“Illinois AG”)
and the CFPB both filed complaints97 against for-profit colleges, claiming that they
had engaged in unfair and abusive practices with respect to institutional loans they
provided or guaranteed.98 These cases led to some of the first court opinions on what

91

See id.; DEANNE LOONIN, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., TOO SMALL TO HELP: THE
PLIGHT OF FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED PRIVATE STUDENT LOAN BORROWERS 6 (2009),
http://www.studentloanborrowerassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/TooSmallto
Help.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3P7-RDAF]; CFPB, PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS 33–34 (Aug. 29,
2012) http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_Reports_Private-Student-Loans.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S3P7-RDAF].
92
FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 89, at 137–38; Robert Kelchen, How
Much Do For-Profit Colleges Rely on Federal Funds?, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2017/01/11/how-much-do-forprofit-colleges-rely-on-federal-funds/ [https://perma.cc/WD9B-5BCC].
93
FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 89, at 144.
94
Id. at 144–46; 20 U.S.C. § 1094(d)(1)(D) (2018); Complaint at ¶¶ 62–67, CFPB v.
Aequitas Capital Mgmt., Inc., No. 17-1278 (D. Or. Aug. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Aequitas
Complaint].
95
FOR-PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 89, at 144–46.
96
See The Looming Student Debt Crisis: Providing Fairness for Struggling Students:
Hearing Before the S. Subcommittee on Admin. Oversight and the Cts. of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 4, 6, 36, 44 (2012) (testimony of Illinois Attorney General Lisa
Madigan and Kentucky Attorney General Jack Conway); CFPB, ANN. REP. OF THE STUDENT
LOAN OMBUDSMAN 11 (2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_StudentLoan-Ombudsman-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LAW-GRPP].
97
As described in the next Section, the Illinois Attorney General amended an existing
complaint which alleged state law UDAP violations by the school.
98
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 75; ITT Complaint, supra note 75.
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constitutes a valid claim for abusiveness under the CFPA.99 More recently, the CFPB
took action against Aequitas Capital Management (“Aequitas”), a hedge fund that
financed Corinthian Colleges’ institutional loans, making similar allegations.100 In
all of these cases, law enforcement alleged high default rates as evidence that the
schools were not considering ability to repay. This Section provides background on
the claims made in each case and the way federal courts evaluated these claims.
1. Illinois v. Westwood College
Westwood College was a national for-profit, post-secondary school with four
campuses in Illinois and an online school that operated in Illinois.101 The Illinois AG
filed a lawsuit against Westwood and its parent company Alta Colleges in January
2012 in Illinois state court, alleging various state UDAP violations, including
misrepresentations about cost, transferability of credits, accreditation, and career
opportunities.102 In 2014, the Illinois AG amended its complaint against Westwood
to include claims that Westwood’s institutional loan program was unfair under the
Illinois UDAP statute and unfair and abusive under the CFPA.103 Central to the
claims was the fact that Westwood continued to make institutional loans despite an
extraordinarily high default rate.104 The Illinois AG alleged that Westwood’s
institutional loans defaulted at rates from 50–90 percent, depending on the cohort,
and that the loans were nothing more than a loss-leader designed to ensure access to
Title IV funding under the 90/10 Rule.105
The Illinois AG alleged that making loans knowing that 50–90 percent of the
students would default was unfair under Illinois’s UDAP statute and the CFPA.106
The Attorney General also alleged that these practices were abusive under the

99

Illinois v. Alta Colls., Inc., No. 14-cv-3786, 2014 WL 4377579 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4,
2014); CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878 (S.D. Ind. 2015).
100
Aequitas Complaint, supra note 94. Several state attorneys general simultaneously
settled with the SEC receiver winding down Aequitas’s assets. The allegations in those
settlements are similar to the CFPB’s. This Article only discusses CFPB’s consent judgment.
See, e.g., Ally Marotti, Ex-Corinthian Students in Illinois Could be Eligible for Part of
$11.6M
Settlement,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Aug.
18,
2017,
4:18
PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-corinthian-student-loans-settlement-0819-biz20170818-story.html [https://perma.cc/X6JF-4392] (describing settlement between the
Aequitas Receiver, the CFPB and 13 state attorneys general).
101
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 75, at ¶ 1.
102
Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief, Illinois v. Alta Colls., Inc., 2014 WL
4377579 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2014) (No. 12 CH 01587).
103
The Westwood matter was removed to federal court in May 2015 following the
amendment to the complaint that added the CFPA claims, providing a basis for federal
question jurisdiction. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 75.
104
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 75, at ¶¶ 136, 462–67.
105
Id. at ¶¶ 90, 113–14.
106
Id. at ¶¶ 467, 479–80.
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CFPA.107 In particular, the Illinois AG alleged that Westwood took unreasonable
advantage of students’ reasonable reliance on the school to act in their interest in
violation of the CFPA, by “[p]ushing students into expensive, high-risk loans
Defendants’ [sic] knew the majority of students would default on for the purpose of
enabling federal funding to support Defendants’ revenue stream.”108 The Illinois AG
further alleged that by failing to tell students that a majority would default on the
institutional loans, Westwood materially interfered with the ability of consumers to
understand the terms and conditions of the institutional loan program;109 took
unreasonable advantage of students’ lack of understanding of the risks, costs, and
conditions of the institutional loan program;110 and took unreasonable advantage of
a borrower’s inability to protect their interest in selecting or using the institutional
loan program.111
Westwood moved to dismiss the Illinois AG’s complaint on several grounds,
including failure to state a claim for unfairness under the Illinois UDAP and
unfairness and abusiveness under the CFPA.112 In September 2014, the Court denied
Westwood’s motion to dismiss in what was the first decision in the country to rule
on what constitutes a claim for abusiveness under the CFPA.113 The Westwood
Court upheld the Illinois AG’s claims that Westwood’s institutional loan program
was unfair under the Illinois UDAP and unfair and abusive under the CFPA.114
Acknowledging that the ability to repay was a factor, the Westwood Court noted
“[p]laintiff also alleges that Westwood takes these actions knowing that most
students will leave Westwood without a degree or the hope of obtaining a wellpaying job and with a debt that will take decades to repay and/or the certainty of
being hounded by collection agencies.”115
2. CFPB v. ITT Technical Institute
ITT was a large, national for-profit college with campuses across the
country.116 In 2014, the CFPB sued ITT alleging that the school engineered and
directed an institutional loan program that was unfair and abusive.117 The CFPB
alleged that ITT offered certain financially needy students short term, no interest

107

Id. at ¶¶ 485–93.
Id. at ¶ 491(d).
109
Id. at ¶ 492(c).
110
Id. at ¶ 492(d).
111
Id. at ¶ 492(e).
112
Illinois v. Alta Colls., Inc., No. 14-cv-3786, 2014 WL 4377579, at *2, *5 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 4, 2014).
113
Id. at *1–*4.
114
Id. at *1–*5.
115
Id. at *2.
116
ITT Complaint, supra note 75.
117
Id.
108
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loans upon enrollment, to meet the “tuition gap” created in part by the 90/10 rule.118
ITT referred to this loan program as “temporary credit.”119 When the temporary
credit came due, the CFPB alleged that students were pulled out of class and told
that they had to pay off the temporary credits to continue their education.120 Students
were presented with the “option” of paying immediately or taking out institutional
loans with third-party lenders.121 Because students enrolled in the temporary credit
program were predominantly low-income, the CFPB alleged that this option was
illusory and most students were compelled to enter into high-cost private loans in
order to continue their educations.122 Third-party lenders nominally originated the
loans, but the CFPB alleged that the loans were guaranteed by, and effectively
offered by, ITT.123 The CFPB further alleged that ITT knew the loans defaulted at
rates exceeding 60 percent and that ITT nonetheless continued the lending
program.124
Like the Westwood Court, the ITT Court found that the CFPB had stated
unfairness and abusiveness claims under the CFPA, denying ITT’s motion to
dismiss.125 ITT argued that the court lacked a standard by which it could measure
the affordability of student loans.126 The court rejected the need for such a measure
under the CFPA’s unfairness standard, holding that the CFPB “must plead that ITT’s
conduct harmed the students’ welfare, and the facts it has plausibly pled could
support such an inference if proven.”127 Among the factors the court identified as
supporting the CFPB unfairness claim included the CFPB’s allegation that “the
students who took out these loans were predominantly in fragile financial health,
and, according to ITT’s own projections, some 64% of them defaulted, exacerbating
their debt and financial distress.”128
The holding in ITT was also one of the first to rule on what constitutes a claim
for abusiveness.129 First, the Court held that CFPB’s allegation that ITT had taken
unreasonable advantage of its students by steering them into loans with a known
default rate in excess of 60 percent in order to achieve financial objectives beyond
the return on the loans was sufficient to state a claim.130 In particular, the court noted:

118

Id. at ¶¶ 4–5, 97.
Id. at ¶¶ 6–12.
120
Id. at ¶ 87.
121
Id. at ¶ 110.
122
CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878, 918 (S.D. Ind. 2015).
123
ITT Complaint, supra note 75, at ¶ 8–11.
124
Id. at ¶ 127.
125
ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d at 915–21.
126
Id. at 914.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 913.
129
See id. at 918–21 (discussing the CFPB’s counts alleging “abusive” acts or
practices).
130
Id. at 918.
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[T]he Bureau has alleged that signing up students for the private loans
enabled ITT to clear the “doubtful assets” represented by the Temporary
Credit off its balance sheets, converting it into “immediate income and
cash-on-hand.” In fact, the Bureau’s allegations quote senior ITT officials
stating that ITT designed the loan programs precisely in order to derive
such an economic benefit from them.131
Second, the ITT Court held that the CFPB adequately pled that students were
unable to protect their interests due to the unequal bargaining power of ITT relative
to the students.132 The court reasoned this bargaining asymmetry created oppressive
circumstances that students were not able to practically avoid, noting similarities
between the “unreasonable advantage” under the CFPA and common law
unconscionability:
A reasonable reading of the statutory language, however, is that it refers
to oppressive circumstances—when a consumer is unable to protect
herself not in absolute terms, but relative to the excessively stronger
position of the defendant. See, e.g., Ting v. AT & T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148–
1149 (9th Cir.2003) (noting that, under doctrine of procedural
unconscionability, a literal, physical lack of consumer choice is not
necessary to show oppressiveness). See also Carey Alexander, Abusive:
Dodd–Frank Section 1031 and the Continuing Struggle to Protect
Consumers, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1105, 1114–1119 (2011) (discussing
the legislative history of the “abusive” standard as consistent with the
understanding that it is a statutory codification of the common-law
doctrine of unconscionability).133
Finally, the ITT court held that ITT took advantage of students’ “reasonable
reliance” that ITT would act in their interests and not steer them into risky loans with
high default rates that would undermine their ability to succeed in college and find
employment after college.134
3. CFPB v. Aequitas
Aequitas, unlike ITT and Westwood, was not a school. Aequitas was a hedge
fund that provided capital to Corinthian Colleges (“Corinthian”), another major forprofit school, in order to fund Corinthian’s institutional loan program.135 Aequitas
would buy the loans made by third parties, effectively funding the loans.136 Aequitas
131

Id.
Id. at 919–20.
133
Id. at 919.
134
Id. at 920.
135
Aequitas Complaint, supra note 94, at ¶ 1.
136
Id. at ¶¶ 1, 4, 24, 28.
132

938

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

would continue to collect on these loans as long as they were current.137 Similar to
ITT, Corinthian guaranteed the loans and would buy the loans from Aequitas when
the loans became delinquent.138 The Aequitas loans allowed Corinthian to stay in
compliance with the 90/10 Rule through the façade that the loans were made by a
third party.139 Compliance with 90/10 allowed Corinthian access to federal student
loans, which gave it the capital to guarantee the loans, mitigating Aequitas’s risk.140
In its complaint against Aequitas, the CFPB alleged that Aequitas engaged in
abusive acts and practices by funding Corinthian’s loan program.141 In particular,
the CFPB alleged that Aequitas funded Corinthian’s loans program knowing the
program was a “sham” with no economic substance and offered as a naked form
regulatory arbitrage to get around the 90/10 rule.142 The CFPB further alleged that
Aequitas’ practices were abusive because default rates on Corinthian’s loan program
“were historically high—between 50 and 70 percent”143 and Aequitas “knew but
disregarded the fact that most Corinthian student borrowers would default on these
loans and would suffer the consequences of such defaults.”144
C. An Emerging Performance-Based Standard in Consumer Law
A brief survey of recent law enforcement actions against for-profit colleges
reveals two new trends in consumer law. First, attorneys general and the CFPB have
begun crafting unfairness and abusiveness claims based on defendants’ failure to
assess borrowers’ ability to repay nonmortgage loans and, to date, courts have
sanctioned this view.145 Second, the CFPB and state attorneys general have
established that data on ex post loan performance can serve as evidence of
improvident lending.146
The modern evolution of improvident lending began with lawsuits against
subprime mortgage lenders, claiming that they violated state law unconscionability
and UDAP statutes by failing to consider whether borrowers could afford their
137

Id. at ¶ 14.
Id. at ¶¶ 29, 90.
139
Id. at ¶¶ 3–4.
140
Id. at ¶ 89–90.
141
Id. at ¶¶ 111–26. Aequitas was taken into SEC receivership, and the SEC receiver
entered into a consent judgment with the CFPB, which was filed at the same time as the
CFPB’s complaint. SEC v. Aequitas Capital Management et al., No. 3:16-cv-00438-PK, (D.
Ore, Mar. 16, 2016) (Stipulated Interim Order appointing Receiver).
142
Id. at ¶¶ 119, 122.
143
Id. at ¶ 5.
144
Id. at ¶ 121.
145
Id.; See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 75, at ¶¶ 79–84; ITT Complaint,
supra note 75, at ¶¶ 166–82.
146
See Illinois v. Alta Colls., Inc., No. 14-cv-3786, 2014 WL 4377579, at *1–*4, (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 4, 2014); CFPB v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878, 915–21 (S.D. Ind.
2015).
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loans.147 The evidence used to determine whether lenders made unaffordable loans
focused on the borrowers’ finances and their loan terms at the time the lenders
originated the loans. For example, in Fremont, the factors used to demonstrate that
the lender knew the borrowers would not be able to repay their loans were known to
Fremont when it made the loans.148 Similarly, in City Financial Services, the Court
concluded that a borrower’s loan was unconscionable based on her debt-to-income
ratio at origination.149 The focus on ex ante risk assessment was not only central to
legal claims against lenders, but also formed a core part of the scholarly push
towards a federal suitability standard.150 Mortgage regulation has a long history of
prescriptive underwriting rules. As such, it is perhaps natural that litigants turned to
objective underwriting standards to demonstrate that mortgage lenders failed to
consider ability-to-repay.
The CFPB and state attorneys general have expanded the jurisprudence on
improvident lending to use loan default rates to demonstrate lenders’ failure to
consider borrowers’ ability to repay.151 Cases alleging improvident student lending
provided a natural forum for this expansion because there is a basis in federal
regulation to use an ex post analysis. The federal cohort default rate examines the
percent of federal student loans that are in default three years after the loans enter
repayment.152 If the default rate at a given institution exceeds certain thresholds, the
institution loses access to Title IV funding.153 In addition, in the private student loan
market, it is widely acknowledged that underwriting is imperfect,154 making default
rates a superior measure of affordability. Students often have a limited credit history
or are embarking on a new career, limiting the ability of financial institutions to
assess their ability to pay.155
Default rate, however, is not the only way to measure unaffordability ex post
and recent regulations in student and payday lending provide alternate measures.156
147

See discussion supra Part I.C.
Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 554 (Mass. 2008).
149
City Fin. Servs v. Smith, No. 97 CVF 00679, 2000 WL 288469, at *2 (Ohio Mun.
Ct. Jan. 4, 2000).
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See Engel & McCoy, supra note 3, at 1334.
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ITT Complaint, supra note 75, at ¶ 12.
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34 C.F.R. § 668.202(a)(2) (2018).
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Id. at § 668.206(a).
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See ANDREW P. KELLY & KEVIN J. JAMES, AM. ENT. INST., LOOKING BACKWARD
OR LOOKING FORWARD? EXPLORING THE PRIVATE STUDENT LOAN MARKET (2016),
https://www.luminafoundation.org/files/resources/looking-backward-or-looking-forward.
pdf [https://perma.cc/35JT-3N8G]. Federal student loans, by contrast, are not underwritten
for risk, but have a host of borrower protections that are not available for private student
loans that make them more appropriate from an ability to repay standpoint such as incomedriven repayment (see 34 C.F.R. § 685.209 (2018)), disability discharge (see id. at
§ 685.213), and closed school discharge (see id. at § 685.214).
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KELLY & JAMES, supra note 154, at 2.
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See Willis, supra note 9, at 1311 (noting that “[p]erformance-based regulation
is . . . more functional and more adaptive than prescriptive regulation”).
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One example is Department of Education’s Gainful Employment Rule, which seeks
to measure whether students have sufficient income to repay their student loans.157
Programs where graduates’ debt-to-income ratio is too high must inform prospective
students and can ultimately lose access to federal student loans.158 Another example
is repayment rate, a relatively new statistic that measures the rate of loans where at
least $1 of principal is paid down within five years.159 Repayment rate has been
lauded as a superior measure of federal student loan performance when compared
with the cohort default rate, as it cuts out the effects of deferments and forbearances,
which can mask whether payments are being made in the short term.160 Finally, the
CFPB’s recently finalized payday regulations look to re-borrowing as evidence of a
lender’s failure to consider a borrower’s ability to repay.161 These three examples
are attempts to determine the affordability of a loan with flexible performance-based
standards as opposed to static underwriting limits.
CONCLUSION
In their landmark article, Making Credit Safer, Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth
Warren lamented the fact that courts were “very circumspect” about applying
doctrines such as unconscionability to lending practices.162 Recent law enforcement
actions against for-profit colleges, however, have shown that some courts are willing
to apply state UDAP and the CFPA to improvident lending. One explanation for this
shift could be changing attitudes in courts after the financial crisis. A second
157
34 C.F.R. §§ 668.401–.415 (2018). In June 2017, however, the U.S. Dept. of
Education announced a new negotiated rulemakings on the gainful employment rules.
Negotiated Rulemaking Committee; Public Hearings, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,640, 27,640 (June 16,
2017).
158
34 C.F.R. §§ 668.401–.415 (2018). The U.S. Department of Education stopped
implementation of some gainful employment disclosures and calculations. See Program
Integrity: Gainful Employment, 82 Fed. Reg. 30,975 (Jul. 5, 2017). Several state attorneys
general have challenged these delays. See Complaint, State of Maryland et al. v. United
States Department of Education et al., No. 1:17-cv-02139, (D. D.C. Oct. 17, 2017).
159
See Michael Stratford, A Tougher Test for Colleges, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 23,
2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/09/23/new-college-scorecardrepayment-data-fuels-debate-over-accountability-higher-ed [https://perma.cc/N6D3-NR75].
160
See, e.g., id.; see also Doug Lederman, A More Meaningful Default Rate, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (Nov. 30, 2007), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/11/30/defaults
[https://perma.cc/B6L9-SS7B] (discussing the benefits of extending the cohort default rate
from two to three years and noting the pros and cons of the CDR as a measurement, including
the problem of forbearances).
161
See CFPB’s Payday Rule, supra note 74, at 54,631.
162
See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 2, at 71. But see State of Colorado et al. v. Center
for Excellence in Higher Education et al., No. 2014 CV 34530 (Denver Dist. Ct., Oct. 13,
2017) (Order denying defendants motion for summary judgment on UCCC Administrator
and state attorney general’s claim that school’s institutional loan program was
unconscionable under Colorado state UCCC.).
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explanation is that recent cases using ex post evidence made ability to repay easier
to evaluate. High-default rates are simple, objective indicators that loans were not
affordable. In contrast, analyzing whether a loan was adequately underwritten to
determine whether a borrower could afford the loan is more nuanced and necessarily
involves a great deal of information; the inquiry must include examining the
borrower’s financial situation in light of the loan terms. Courts’ increased
willingness to entertain improvident lending claims and the ease with which ex post
default evidence can be marshaled provide some hope for regulators and private
litigants who seek to curb predatory lending practices.
The current President and Congress seem intent on rolling back many of the
federal protections put in place in the last decade to prevent another financial
crisis.163 Moreover, certain regulators are attempting to use federal preemption of
state law to blunt state efforts to regulate unfair and abusive lending practices.164 In
this environment, the ability of state law enforcement to bring claims against entities
engaged in predatory lending for violations of laws of general applicability is
increasingly important. The CFPB and Illinois AG’s claims against for-profit
colleges provide a useful template for future actions.
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